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Positive 
POSITIVE psychology was launched with Martin Seligman’s APA PresidentialAddress in 1998.The first American Psychologist of the new millennium (January2000,Vol. 55) was dedicated to positive psychology.The momentum of that
auspicious start has grown ever since. In this special issue of The Psychologist, we have
sought to give a truly international flavour of what positive psychology is about and,
more importantly, why we believe it can make a real difference to our practice as
psychologists.
As Martin Seligman notes, positive psychology is about ‘happiness’. Ruut Veenhoven
comprehensively answers some critiques that have been made of this concept, and its
desirability as a social good. Ilona Boniwell and Philip Zimbardo explore how a balanced
time perspective may be one of the keys to achieving a good life, while Paul Baltes and
Ute Kunzmann consider another peak of human excellence in wisdom.Antonella Delle
Fave and Fausto Massimini look at optimal experience in people with disabilities, a theme
of triumph over adversity that is expanded by Alex Linley and Stephen Joseph in their
article about post-traumatic growth. Maintaining this practitioner focus, Roger
Bretherton and Roderick Ørner consider existential psychotherapy as a ‘positive
psychotherapy in disguise’, with its emphasis on strengths and meaning, framed within 
a context of irreversible human limitations. From an occupational psychology perspective
Jonathan Hill examines how the resources of work psychologists may be deployed more
positively, while Jane Henry looks at what makes positive organisations different. Moving
to a social level of analysis,Andrew Oswald gives an economist’s perspective on how the
effects of external factors on psychological well-being can be measured. Ed Cairns and
Christopher Alan Lewis link their work in peace psychology with the focus of positive
psychology, suggesting that a combination of the two provides a powerful force for
constructive change following war and conflict.
Far be it from us to claim that this collection of short articles represents the whole
of positive psychology. However, we hope that by the time you reach our concluding
statement, we will have done enough to whet your appetite and to encourage you, as
fellow psychologists, to think carefully about the advantages of applying positive
psychology in your practice.
Guest editors P.ALEX LINLEY, STEPHEN JOSEPH and ILONA BONIWELL
welcome you to the special issue on positive psychology.
FOR the last half century psychologyhas been largely consumed with a single topic only – mental illness
– and it has done fairly well with it.
Psychologists can now measure with some
precision such formerly fuzzy concepts as
depression and alcoholism. We now know
a fair amount about how these troubles
develop across the lifespan, and about 
their genetics, their biochemistry and their
psychological causes. Best of all, we have
learned how to relieve some of these
disorders. But this progress has come at 
a high cost. Relieving the states that make
life miserable has relegated building the
states that make life worth living to a
distant back seat.
There has been a profound obstacle to 
a science and practice of positive traits and
positive states: the belief that virtue and
happiness are inauthentic, epiphenomenal,
parasitic upon or reducible to the negative
traits and states. This ‘rotten-to-the-core’
view pervades Western thought, and if
there is any doctrine positive psychology
seeks to overthrow it is this one. Its original
manifestation is the doctrine of original sin.
In secular form, Freud dragged this
doctrine into 20th-century psychology
where it remains fashionably entrenched 
in academia today. For Freud, all of
civilisation is just an elaborate defence
against basic conflicts over infantile
sexuality and aggression. So Bill Gates’s
competitiveness is really a desire to outdo
his father, and Princess Diana’s opposition
to land mines was but the outcome of
sublimating a murderous hate for Prince
Charles and the other royals. Positive
motives, like exercising fairness or
pursuing duty, are ruled out as
fundamental; there must be some covert,
negative motivation that underpins
goodness if the analysis is to be
academically respectable.
In spite of its widespread acceptance in
the religious and secular world, there is not
a shred of evidence, not an iota of data, that
compels us to believe that virtue is derived
from negative motivation. On the contrary,
I believe that evolution has favoured both
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sorts of traits, and any number of adaptive
roles in the world have selected for
morality, cooperation, altruism, and
goodness, just as any number have also
selected for murder, theft, self-seeking,
and terrorism. The rotten-to-the-core 
view is only a theory, and not a very
comprehensive one at that. More plausible
is the dual aspect theory that the strengths
and the virtues are just as basic to human
nature as the negative traits.
Positive psychology is about
‘happiness’, and I could fill the rest of
these pages with just a fraction of the
attempts to take this promiscuously
overused word and make sense of it. But
that is not my intention. Rather I want to
lay out a terminology upon which a
scientifically viable positive psychology
might rest. In doing so, I distinguish three
desirable lives: the pleasant life, the good
life, and the meaningful life.
The pleasant life
I use ‘happiness’ and ‘well-being’
interchangeably as soft, overarching terms
to describe the goals of the whole positive
psychology enterprise. It is important to
recognise that ‘happiness’ and ‘well-being’
sometimes refer to feelings, such as ecstasy
and comfort, but they also sometimes refer
to positive activities that have no feeling
component at all, such as absorption and
engagement. 
Happiness and well-being are the
desired outcomes of positive psychology.
Because the ways of enhancing them differ,
I divide the positive emotions into three
kinds: those directed toward the past (e.g.
satisfaction, contentment, pride, serenity),
the future (e.g. optimism, hope, confidence,
trust, faith) or the present. 
The positive emotions about the 
present divide into two crucially different
categories that I call the pleasures and the
gratifications. The pleasures themselves
comprise bodily pleasures and higher
pleasures. The bodily pleasures are
momentary positive emotions that come
through the senses: delicious tastes and
smells, sexual feelings, moving your body
well, delightful sights and sounds. We use
words such as scrumptiousness, warmth,
and orgasm to describe such pleasures. The
higher pleasures are also momentary, but
they are set off by events more complicated
and more learned than sensory ones,
and they are defined by the feelings they
bring about: ecstasy, rapture, thrill, bliss,
gladness, mirth, glee, fun, ebullience,
comfort, amusement, relaxation and the
like. The pleasures of the present, like the
positive emotions about the past and the
future, are at rock bottom subjective; and
there exist measures of positive emotion
that are repeatable, stable across time and
consistent across situations.
Add all this together and you get what 
I refer to as the pleasant life: a life that
successfully pursues the positive emotions
about the present, past and future.
The good life
The gratifications are the other class of
positive emotions about the present, but
unlike the pleasures, they are not feelings,
but activities we like doing – reading, rock-
climbing, dancing, good conversation,
volleyball, or playing bridge, for example.
The gratifications absorb and engage us
fully, they block self-consciousness, they
block felt emotion (except in retrospect –
‘Wow, that was fun!’), they create flow,
a state in which time stops and one feels
completely at home. 
The gratifications cannot be obtained 
or permanently increased without
developing the strengths and virtues.
Happiness is therefore not just about
obtaining pleasant, momentary subjective
states. Our strengths and virtues are the
natural routes to gratification, and the
gratifications are the routes to what I
conceive the good life to be: using your
strengths and virtues to obtain abundant
gratification in the main realms of life.
The meaningful life
The great lesson of the endless debates
about ‘what is happiness’ is that happiness
comes by many routes. Looked at in this
way it becomes our life task to deploy our
strengths and virtues in the major realms of
living: work, love, parenting. Importantly,
a ‘happy’ individual need not experience 
all or even most of the positive emotions
and gratifications. 
A meaningful life adds one more
component to the good life – it is the use of
your strengths and virtues in the service of
something much larger than you are.
Well, that was a mouthful. It is the gist
of Seligman (2002), and of Peterson and
Seligman (in press). Those eager to read
more should turn there as well as to the
articles that follow in this special issue.
 Martin Seligman is Fox Leadership
Professor of Psychology at the University
of Pennsylvania. E-mail:
seligman@cattell.psych.upenn.edu.
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Fundamental assumptions
MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN believes that the things that
make life worth living have been neglected for too long.
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‘it becomes our life task to
employ our strengths and
virtues in the major realms
of living: work, love, parenting’
UTILITARIAN philosopherJeremy Bentham (1789/1996)wrote that the moral worth of all
action should be judged by the degree to
which it contributes to the ‘greater
happiness of a greater number’. This has
proved to be a controversial view (see
Smart & Williams, 1973), with several
objections raised:
 Happiness is undefined; hence the
philosophy is meaningless.
 Happiness is unmeasurable; hence 
the philosophy lacks consequence.
 Happiness is fleeting; enduring
happiness is hence impossible.
 Happiness is for a happy few; happiness
for the ‘greater number’ is hence
illusionary.
 Happiness is relative; ‘greater’
happiness is hence impracticable.
 Happiness spoils; great happiness for 
a great number is hence undesirable.
 Given this, we would be better to aim at
goals of more tangible worth, like social
justice and psychological autonomy.
Happiness became the subject of empirical
research in the 1960s. To date, 3300 studies
have considered the matter, listed in the
World Database of Happiness (see
‘Weblinks’ box) and recently reviewed by
Diener (1999) and Argyle (2002). From the
perspective of this research I would argue
that the objections raised are misguided. 
Happiness can be defined Bentham
defined happiness as ‘the sum of pleasures
and pains’. Similarly happiness is currently
conceived as ‘the overall appreciation of
one’s life as a whole’. In this
conceptualisation, happiness is an outcome
of life and is distinct from preconditions
for a good life, such as a liveable
environment and good life-abilities. This
conception differs from current notions of
‘quality of life’, which combine anything
good (Veenhoven, 2000). 
Happiness can be measured Happiness
is a conscious state of mind; hence it can
be measured by simply asking people
about it. It is an overall judgement; so it
can be measured by single questions. Thus
happiness can be assessed in large-scale
surveys. Several standard questions have
shown to be quite valid and reasonably
reliable (Diener, 1995). Degree and duration
of happiness are combined in assessment
of ‘happy life-years’ (Veenhoven, 1996). 
Enduring happiness is possible Though
some things called happiness are fleeting
(e.g. luck and ecstasy), happiness in this
sense is not. Follow-ups after one year
show stability rates in the range of .65. 
Happiness of a great number is
possible Unhappiness prevails in some
parts of the present-day world, but the
majority are happy in most nations. In
2000 only 4 per cent of the British ticked
‘not at all satisfied’ on a Eurobarometer
survey question about global satisfaction
with the life that one leads (European
Commission, 2000). Time-sampling studies
on daily affect also show a preponderance
of good mood. These results cannot be
disposed of as being the result of
measurement bias or cognitive
accommodation. 
Greater happiness is possible At the
macro level, happiness depends heavily on
societal qualities such as wealth, justice
and freedom. Social policy can improve
these conditions. At the meso level,
happiness depends on institutional
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RUUT VEENHOVEN argues that contemporary research
shows that public policy could – and should – be aimed
at advancing happiness.
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ILONA BONIWELL and PHILIP
ZIMBARDO argue that a balanced
time perspective is an ideal
foundation for leading a ‘good life’.
qualities, like autonomy at work or in care
institutions. Organisational reform can
improve such situations. At the micro level,
happiness depends on personal capabilities
like efficacy, independence and social
skills. Education and therapy can improve
these proficiencies. 
Improvement is not always nullified 
by habituation or by a shift in standards 
of reference. Happiness is not relative.
Contrary to common beliefs, happiness is
not the result of cognitive evaluation but 
of spontaneous affective state (Veenhoven,
1991). 
Nor are improvements neutralised by 
a fixed view on life. Happiness is not a trait
(Veenhoven, 1994). 
Happiness does not deprave Follow-
up studies on consequences of happiness
have shown positive effects on moral
behaviour: happiness fosters altruism and
sociability. There is also evidence that
happiness promotes activity and initiative,
but no indication for negative effects on
creativity. Last but not least, happiness is
positive for health: happy people live
longer (Veenhoven, 1988). 
Happiness is a good outcome
criterion Quality of life (QoL) is
typically measured by the presence of
conditions deemed good for people;
happiness indicates how well people
actually flourish. Current QoL-indexes are
scores of very different things that cannot
be meaningfully added, while happiness
provides an obvious overall appraisal of
life. Current indexes treat external
conditions and inner capabilities separately;
happiness reflects the apparent ‘fit’ of
conditions and capabilities. Given this,
happiness is the best outcome criterion
available (Veenhoven, 2000, 2002). 
All in all, the criterion of happiness has
value and should be used more in assessing
outcomes of social policies and
psychological therapies. 
 Professor Ruut Veenhoven is at
Erasmus University, Rotterdam. E-mail:
veenhoven@fsw.eur.nl.
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Time to find the
right balance
CENTRAL to the discipline ofpositive psychology (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) is the
answer to the question ‘What makes life
worth living?’ or simply ‘What is “a good
life”?’ One key to learning how to live a
fulfilling life is discovering how to achieve
a balanced time perspective: the ability to
switch one’s temporal focus according to
the demands of the current behavioural
setting (Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999).
The importance of time in our lives is
evident from time themes in poetry, song,
proverbs, homilies, as well as time
discourses and metaphors, even in
childhood fairy tales. An image of
Cinderella, having to win over a prince’s
heart within very tight temporal constraints
and mindful that present pleasures are
transient, is likely to be embedded in the
consciousness of many Western children. In
idiomatic use, time is a commodity that can
be spent, used, saved, maximised or wasted. 
The subjective conception of focusing
on various temporal categories or time
frames when making decisions and taking
action is one’s time perspective (TP). It is
one of the most powerful influences on
virtually all aspects of human behaviour, in
particular affecting our quality of life. TP is
a dimension composed of categories along
each of which individuals vary. A single
integrated scale for measuring TP has been
developed – the Zimbardo Time Perspective
Inventory (ZTPI) – which is reliable, valid
and easy to use. Five main factors underlie
the ZTPI – past-negative, past-positive,
present-hedonistic, present-fatalistic and
future factors. These were derived from a
series of exploratory studies and have been
continuously empirically refined (Gonzalez
& Zimbardo, 1985; Zimbardo & Boyd,
1999; Zimbardo & Gonzalez, 1984). 
Let us give a flavour of what different
time perspectives relate to. Past TP is
associated with focus on family, tradition
and history. This can be either negative or
positive. A past-negative TP is associated
with focusing on personal experiences that
were aversive or noxious, while the past-
positive TP reflects a warm, pleasurable,
often sentimental and nostalgic view of
one’s past with an emphasis on maintaining
relationships with family and friends.
The present-hedonistic TP is associated
with the enjoyment of present momentary
activities and with little concern over
consequences of behaviour. This kind of
person is essentially a biological creature,
determined by stimuli, situational emotions
and spontaneity, being oriented towards
sensation and pleasure seeking. The
present-fatalistic TP, on the other hand,
is associated with hopelessness and
immutable beliefs that outside forces
control one’s life. 
A person with a future TP is concerned
with working for future goals and rewards,
often at the expense of present enjoyment.
A future-oriented individual lives in
abstraction, suppressing the reality of the
present for the imagined reality of an ideal
future world. The third little pig who built
his house from bricks, estimating the
possible dangers and uncertainties of the
future, was almost certainly future-oriented.
The TP construct has been found to be
related to many behaviours, attitudes,
values and status variables, such as
delinquency, educational achievement,
health, sleep and dreaming patterns, and
choices of romantic partner. Time
perspective is predictive of a wide range of
behaviours. For example, a present TP has
been found to relate to risky driving and
other forms of risk taking (Zimbardo et al.,
1997), and also to predilections to sexual
behaviours and substance abuse of alcohol
and drugs (Keough et al., 1999).
Unemployed people living in shelters who
have a future TP are more likely to use
their time constructively to seek jobs, and
those with present TP tend to engage in
non-instrumental activities or to waste time
watching TV (Epel et al., 1999). 
Although each of the TP factors has
some value, an excessive orientation
towards any one perspective can become
dysfunctional. For example, Western ways
of life have become predominantly goal-
and future-oriented. Time-saving
technological devices serve the function of
increasing productivity and efficiency, but
fail to free up actual time to enjoy oneself
(Zimbardo, 2002). The concept of ‘time
famine’ is often used to account for the
lack of time and people’s difficulty in
finding an optimal balance of time use. For
example, rather than becoming symbolic of
freedom from situational constraints, the
dilution of boundaries between work and
home has resulted in the future-oriented
time perspective associated with work
becoming applied to our leisure time as
well. Also, having largely replaced the
traditional culture of written letters, we can
question whether e-mail technology has led
to speedier communication processes or to
an increase of necessary and unnecessary
contacts. 
There are costs and sacrifices 
associated with valuing achievement-
oriented ‘workaholic’ traits over and above
life enjoyment and social engagement. It
emerges that friends, church, family,
recreation, hobbies, even household chores,
come high on the list of the activities we
can omit (Myers, 2000). The danger here 
is the risk of undermining the rituals and
narratives essential to a sense of family,
community and nation. 
However, an abundance of time does
not automatically lead to a more fulfilling
life. Retired and unemployed people often
suffer from depression, and many people
do not find their leisure time rewarding
(Argyle cited in Mulgan & Wilkinson,
1995). Csikszentmihalyi (1992) suggests
that the dominant proportion of leisure is
wasted in passive entertainment, such as
television viewing, and is not enjoyed by
the participants. Passive television 
viewing accounts for nearly a third of
leisure time (Tyrrell, 1995) and has been
found to be associated with boredom, low
levels of concentration, low levels of
potency, lack of clarity of thought and lack
of flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1992). Russell
(cited in Lane, 1995) writes: ‘To be able 
to fill leisure intelligently is the last 
product of civilisation, and at present 
very few people have reached that level.’
(p.14.) 
Can such unsatisfying use of leisure
time be viewed as characteristic of a lack
of balance in our temporal perspective and
the inability to be flexible in shifting from
one temporal orientation to another? For
example, immersion in future- and
achievement-oriented perspectives of work
may make it difficult to return to a present-
oriented ‘here and now’ perspective for
relaxation. So the only way to ‘switch off’
becomes to enter the atemporal, mindless
experience of passive television viewing. 
Here is where the ideal of a ‘balanced
time perspective’ comes into play. It is
proposed as a more positive alternative to
living life as a slave to a particular
temporal bias. In an optimally balanced
time perspective, the past, present and
future components blend and flexibly
engage, depending on a situation’s
demands and our needs and values
(Zimbardo, 2002). It does seem that people
are capable of achieving a more balanced
time perspective. In a recent study in South
Africa (Zimbardo, 2001) a substantial
proportion of participants obtained high
scores on three (past-positive, present-
hedonistic and future) of five factors of 
the ZTPI, thus showing balance across the
temporal perspectives. This is in contrast
with most studies, where participants tend
to show an imbalance through high scores
on only one or two factors. 
People with a balanced time perspective
are capable of operating within a temporal
mode appropriate to the situation in which
they find themselves. So when they spend
time with their families and friends they
are fully with them. When they take a day
off work, they get involved in recreation
rather than feel guilty about the work they
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haven’t done. However, when working 
and studying they may well put their more
appropriate future TP hat on and work
more productively. 
Why is such flexibility so important?
Are people with a balanced TP likely to 
be happier than the rest of us? Functioning
within past-positive and present-hedonistic
modes enhances your chances of
developing happy personal relationships,
which is a key factor in enhancing one’s
well-being, according to the findings of
research with exceptionally happy people
(Diener & Seligman, in press). On the
other hand, a future TP is correlated with
higher socio-economic status, which is
moderately associated with well-being
(Diener, 2000).
Despite being mainly conceived at 
a theoretical level, a balanced TP offers
considerable potential for practical
interventions in clinical and occupational
psychology. The focus of time management
techniques can shift from advocating
generalised time-management strategies,
to developing interventions based on an
understanding of workers’ TP profiles and
TP cognitive biases that unconsciously
dominate their lives. Such techniques can
be useful in the prevention of occupational
stress or for solving the dilemmas of
work–leisure balance. 
Research is currently in progress to
establish a relationship between TP and the
way people actually use their time, looking
at whether a balanced TP is associated with
a more optimal time use, higher well-being
and with a higher level of satisfaction with
one’s own time use (Boniwell, 2002).
Laughing when it’s time to laugh, working
when it’s time to work, playing when it’s
time to play, listening to grandma’s old
stories, connecting with your friends,
valuing desire and passion, and taking
fuller control of your life; these should be
some of the benefits of learning to achieve
a balanced time perspective. They are
possible keys to unlocking personal
happiness and finding more meaning 
in life despite the relentless, indifferent
movement of life’s time clock. The value 
of a balanced time perspective is that it 
suggests new approaches to psychological
interventions while offering yet another
answer to the question ‘What is a good
life?’
 Ilona Boniwell is at the Open
University. E-mail: ilona@ntlworld.com.
 Professor Philip G. Zimbardo is at
Stanford University, California. E-mail:
zim@apa.org.
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PAUL B. BALTES and UTE
KUNZMANN believe that wisdom is
the peak of human excellence.
Wisdom
THE search for human excellencehas been a long journey. One of the main guideposts has been the
concept of wisdom (e.g. Assmann, 1994;
Kekes, 1995; Lehrer et al., 1996). At the
core of this concept is the notion of the
perfect, quasi-utopian integration of
knowledge and character, of mind and virtue.
At the Berlin Max Planck Institute for
Human Development, the first author and
colleagues have studied ways of defining
wisdom as a psychological construct (e.g.
Baltes et al., 1984; Baltes et al., 2002;
Baltes & Smith, 1990; Baltes & Staudinger,
2000). In this article we will discuss this
conceptualisation of wisdom and
summarise major findings from our
research on the development, antecedents,
correlates and consequences of wisdom.
Because wisdom is considered an ideal
endpoint of human development, the
original impetus for psychological work 
on this concept evolved in the context of
lifespan psychology and the study of ageing
(e.g. Clayton & Birren, 1980; Sternberg,
1990). The search for positive human
functioning has been a hallmark in the field
of developmental psychology since its
inception (see Lerner, 2002). Two
examples: Piaget, with his characterisation
of intelligence, attempted to capture
optimal cognitive development; in his
theory on personality development Erikson
believed that concepts such as generativity
and wisdom define progress in
psychological maturity during adulthood.
In our psychological conceptualisation
of wisdom we have proceeded from
philosophical and cultural-anthropological
conceptions of wisdom and placed these
into the context of psychological theory 
and methods. On the most general level we
have defined wisdom as expert knowledge
and judgement about important, difficult
and uncertain questions associated with the
meaning and conduct of life. Wisdom-
related knowledge deals with matters of
utmost personal and social significance.
To test for wisdom we present people
with difficult hypothetical situations. For
example, imagine that someone gets a call
from a good friend who says that he or she
cannot go on anymore and wants to commit
suicide. Or a 15-year-old girl wants to get
married right away. What could one
consider and do? These situations differ
from tasks that have been developed in
intelligence research in that they are poorly
defined and characterised by multiple
solutions. High-quality responses to these
situations therefore require exceptional
intellectual and social-emotional abilities.
We use a standardised procedure to
collect think-aloud responses. A response 
to the problem of the 15-year-old girl might
be: ‘Well, on the surface, this seems like an
easy problem. On average, marriage for 15-
year-old girls is not a good thing. On the
other hand, thinking about getting married
is not the same as actually doing it. I guess
many girls think about it without getting
married in the end… There are situations
where the average case doesn’t fit. Perhaps
special life circumstances are involved. The
girl may have a terminal illness. She may
not be from this country or perhaps she
lives in another culture…’
Trained raters evaluate responses 
such as these by using five criteria that 
we specify as defining wisdom-related
knowledge: (a) factual knowledge about
life and lifespan development, (b)
procedural knowledge about strategies of
life development, (c) knowledge about the
context of lives and their dynamics, (d)
knowledge about value relativism and
‘Wisdom-related knowledge
deals with matters of utmost
personal and social
significance’
tolerance, and (e) knowledge indicative 
of the awareness and management of
uncertainty. The assessment of wisdom-
related knowledge on the basis of these
criteria exhibits satisfactory reliability 
and validity.
Our research programme involved many
variations including inquiry into the effects
of age, gender and professional
specialisation on wisdom-related
knowledge. We also studied adults (public
figures) who were nominated by an expert
panel as being wise – independently of our
own definition of wisdom. The nominees
scored higher on our wisdom tasks than
comparison groups of similarly aged and
educated adults. This finding was important
as it demonstrated that our conception of
wisdom had ecological validity. Finally, in
another line of research, we explored ways
of optimising adults’ wisdom-related
performance by teaching them certain
mnemonic techniques or by providing the
opportunity for social discourse and the use
of ‘inner voices’ (Staudinger & Baltes,
1996). What were our major findings?
Findings
First, and true to the spirit of wisdom as
representing excellence of utopian quality,
high levels of wisdom-related knowledge
are rare. Many adults are on the way
towards wisdom, but very few people
approach a high level of wisdom-related
knowledge as we measure it.
Second, the period of late adolescence
and early adulthood is the primary age
window for wisdom-related knowledge to
emerge. In the older-than-young-adulthood
samples we observed no further changes 
of the average level of wisdom beyond 
the level achieved in early adulthood.
Furthermore, our findings suggest that 
the ages of life have their own wisdom-
knowledge specialities. When the content
of wisdom tasks is age-matched, people
show higher levels of performance (for 
a review see Staudinger, 1999).
Third, for wisdom-related knowledge
and judgement to develop further, either
beyond the level achieved in early
adulthood or in one’s own course of
lifespan development, factors other than
age become critical. It takes a complex
coalition of enhancing factors from a
variety of domains: psychological, social,
professional and historical. If such a
coalition is present, some individuals
continue a developmental trajectory
towards higher levels of wisdom-related
knowledge. As a consequence, older adults
are, perhaps disproportionately, among the
top performers in such knowledge. A high
level of wisdom-related knowledge, then,
appears to be more prevalent in older
adults, although simply getting older is 
not a sufficient condition.
Fourth, during adulthood the most
powerful predictors of wisdom-related
knowledge are not cognitive factors such 
as intelligence. Higher predictive value is
offered by personality-related factors, such
as openness to experience, generativity,
creativity, or a judicial cognitive style (i.e.
a preference for comparing, evaluating and
judging information). In addition, specific
life experiences (e.g. being trained and
practising in a field concerned with
difficult life problems), having wisdom-
enhancing mentors, or having been
exposed to certain idiographic events or
societal conditions, and a sense of mastery
of these experiences, all contribute to
higher levels of wisdom-related knowledge.
Fifth, our intervention work showed that
people possess larger amounts of wisdom-
related knowledge than is evident in our
standard assessment procedure. For
instance, people express a markedly higher
level of wisdom-related knowledge if
guided by memory cueing or internal
dialogues with significant others.
In sum, the acquisition of high levels 
of wisdom, beyond an average level of
wisdom-related knowledge available to
many, seems to be dependent on a coalition
of ontogenetic factors that, in combination,
enhance the development of wisdom.
Wisdom as studied by us is not a primarily
cognitive phenomenon. Rather, our
analyses suggest that wisdom involves
cognitive, emotional and motivational
characteristics, and is a variant neither of
intelligence nor of personality dimensions
that can be assessed with psychometric
tests. None of the many constructs that 
we considered in our studies explains more
than a small share of the reliable variance
in wisdom-related knowledge.
Wisdom, emotion and values
The important role of emotions and values
in the acquisition and expression of
wisdom has been further substantiated by
more recent work (Kunzmann & Baltes, in
press). People higher in wisdom-related
knowledge evince a more complex and
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modulated profile of emotions. For
instance, they show a lesser preference for
values whose primary focus is on one’s own
happiness. Rather, they show a preference
for values that consider the welfare of
others and report engaging themselves in
the interest of others, including strategies of
negotiation in conflict resolution.
More recently we have also begun 
to link wisdom-related knowledge to
behavioural expressions of developmental
regulation, such as the selection and pursuit
of personal goals (Baltes & Freund, in
press). Does wisdom-related knowledge
play a role in lifespan development and 
its regulation? The model of successful
development ‘selective optimisation with
compensation’ (SOC) posits that the
orchestration of three regulatory processes
produces successful development: selection
of goals, optimisation of goal-relevant
means and compensation of lost means by
substitute means (Baltes & Baltes, 1990;
Freund & Baltes, 2002).
In our conception, wisdom and SOC
operate together in the following way. On
the basis of wisdom, people can define and
select those goals and means that are
socially acceptable and desirable in human
development. For instance, the spectrum of
wisdom-related goals requires that these
goals are oriented towards the personal and
the common good and that the means used
in goal attainment do not violate the
resources and rights of others. The life
management strategy of SOC, on the other
hand, is value-neutral. Without evaluating
the moral and ethical dimension of the
behaviour involved, SOC specifies the
conditions by which advances and success
in any domain of human efficacy and
performance are possible. In terms of the
use of SOC, a mafia boss can be as
effective as Mother Theresa. Therefore,
wisdom and SOC need to be intertwined.
In our view, wisdom is a topic that holds
much promise as psychologists turn their
attention to positivity and excellence in
human behaviour. Considering the intricate
problems of our lives in a society often
driven by individualistic and materialistic
motives (e.g. Myers, 2000), wisdom points
to another set of avenues for satisfaction
and happiness. Its very foundation lies in
the orchestration of mind and virtue
towards the personal and public good.
 Professor Paul B. Baltes and Dr Ute
Kunzmann are at the Center for Lifespan
Psychology, Max Planck Institute for
Human Development, Berlin. E-mail:
sekbaltes@mpib-berlin.mpg.de.
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THE European Community declared2003 the Year of Disabled Citizens,emphasising the need for policies
focused on people’s own perspective.
Information on how disabled people
experience their lives, social relations and
daily activities and situations is essential to
centre intervention programmes on individual
resources rather than on social expectations.
Quality of life depends not only on health
conditions but also on personality and style
of interaction with the environment. Sick
people frequently report positive
consequences of illness, such as improved
relationships, positive personality changes,
and even a better quality of life (Albrecht &
Devlieger, 1999; Sodergren & Hyland,
2000). In this article we investigate the
positive experiences disabled people report
in daily life and their potential in fostering
personal growth and social integration.
The revised International Classification
of Functioning, Disability and Health
(World Health Organization, 2001)
conceptualises disablement as an interaction
between individual and environmental
features comprising three dimensions:
impairment of biological or psychological
structures or functions; activity limitations;
and participation restrictions (consequences
of impairment that limit or prevent the
fulfilment of expected social roles). 
Environmental factors, such as cultural
norms and economic conditions, can hinder
or help the social integration of disabled
people. In turn, individuals actively engage
with their environment. Day by day they
invest their attention in a subset of
activities, relationships and values that they
select from the cultural context. This
lifelong process, known as psychological
selection (Csikszentmihalyi & Massimini,
1985), is based on the quality of experience
reported in daily activities (Massimini &
Delle Fave, 2000). In particular, people
prefer to carry out and cultivate activities
associated with optimal experience
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). This state of
consciousness is characterised by the
perception of high environmental
ANTONELLA DELLE FAVE and
FAUSTO MASSIMINI suggest a way
to promote autonomy and social
integration.
Making disability
into a resource
‘Physical impairments…can
help individuals discover new
opportunities for optimal
experience’
PH
IL
IP
W
O
LM
U
TH
(R
EP
O
RT
D
IG
IT
A
L.C
O
.U
K)
challenges, high personal skills,
concentration, enjoyment, control of the
situation and intrinsic motivation. Optimal
experience shows a dynamic structure that
is crucial for personal growth and skill
development. By constantly practising a
given activity, the individual will master
increasing difficulties, and consequently
search for new and higher challenges. 
We analysed the role of optimal
experience in the lives of disabled 
people through the Flow Questionnaire
(Csikszentmihalyi & Csikszentmihalyi,
1988). In a sample of 56 people with
congenital disabilities (blindness and motor
impairments) all but one reported optimal
experience in their lives, mostly associating
it with work, study and the use of media
(Delle Fave, 2001; Delle Fave & Maletto,
1992). These results highlight the potential
of optimal experience in fostering well-
being and social integration: jobs and
learning were occasions for enjoyment,
intrinsic reward and skill development, as
well as opportunities for participation in
the productive life.
We administered the same questionnaire
to 45 people who became blind, paraplegic
or tetraplegic during adolescence or
adulthood (Delle Fave, 1996; Delle Fave &
Maletto, 1992). They had to face dramatic
changes, often being deprived of activities
previously associated with optimal
experiences. Nevertheless, 41 participants
recognised optimal experience in their
present life. Blind people mostly associated
it with media (reading in Braille, listening
to radio and TV) and work, paraplegic and
tetraplegic people with sport, work and
physiotherapy. Participants had preserved
optimal experience after the onset of
disability, discovering new activities or
adapting previous ones to their changed
physical conditions. Blind people learned
to read in Braille. People with motor
impairments acquired new skills in sports
such as basketball and table tennis, and
through rehabilitation practice, which is
vital for reintegration into active life after
spinal injuries (Massimini & Delle Fave,
2000). 
Our findings suggest that physical
impairments, rather than preventing
development, can help individuals discover
new opportunities for optimal experience
and can foster personal growth. For this
reason, rehabilitation programmes and
integration projects should pursue two
goals. At the environmental level they
should provide meaningful opportunities
for social integration. At the individual
level they should focus on the activities
subjectively associated with optimal
experiences in order to exploit the
behavioural flexibility and resource
potential of disabled people, promoting
their development and their active
contribution to culture.
 Professor Antonella Delle Fave and
Professor Fausto Massimini are in the
Dipartimento di Scienze Precliniche LITA
Vialba, Università degli Studi di Milano,
Italy. E-mail: antonella.dellefave@unimi.it.
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VARIOUS philosophies, literaturesand religions throughout historyhave conveyed the idea that there
is personal gain to be found in suffering
(Linley, in press). Although much evidence
has been accumulated for post-traumatic
stress in survivors of various traumatic
events (e.g. Joseph et al., 1997), there is
also a growing body of empirical evidence
that trauma can provide the impetus for
personal and social transformation (see
Tedeschi et al., 1998, for a review).
For example, in some early work with
survivors of the Herald of Free Enterprise
disaster we found that 46 per cent of
people said that their view of life had
changed for the worse. But 43 per cent said
it had changed for the better, saying things
like ‘I don’t take life for granted anymore’,
‘I value my family and friends much more
now’ and ‘I live every day to the full now’
(Joseph et al., 1993). In the last few years
we have begun to turn our attention to this
new question (see Linley & Joseph, 2002):
Why is it that some people are able to grow
and thrive as a result of traumatic
experience, achieving a higher level of
functioning and self-actualisation than 
they enjoyed before the trauma? 
Positive changes
It has been found that between 30 and 90
per cent of people who experience some
form of traumatic event report at least some
positive changes following trauma, with the
figure varying dependent on the type of
event and many other factors (Calhoun 
& Tedeschi, 1999). These positive changes
can underpin a whole new way of living
that embraces the central tenets of positive
psychology (Linley, 2000). People may
 change their life philosophy, learning 
to appreciate each day to the full (i.e.
positive subjective experience) and
renegotiating what really matters to
them in the full realisation that their 
life is finite (Tedeschi et al., 1998);
 believe themselves to be wiser or act
more altruistically in the service of
others (i.e. positive individual
characteristics) and have a greater sense
of personal resilience and strength,
perhaps coupled with more acceptance
of their vulnerabilities and limitations;
 dedicate their energies to social renewal
or political activism (i.e. positive
institutions and communities); or
 report that their relationships are
enhanced in some way, for example
valuing their friends and family more
(i.e. positive social relationships). 
However, trauma survivors embrace this
positive approach to life within a context of
tragic hopefulness. They know at first hand
the ups and downs, and the limits of human
life. This awareness guides them to live
their lives in a way that is truly and
positively authentic, interpreting their
trauma as a valued learning opportunity
and giving back to others through the
benefit of their experience (Harvey, 2001).
Psychotherapy and counselling
Early indications are that people who
report more growth in the aftermath of
trauma go on to show better long-term
adjustment. Therefore the facilitation of
growth is a legitimate therapeutic goal
(Linley & Joseph, 2002). Given that
research remains in its infancy, it is too
early to be certain of the specific
therapeutic implications. But what we are
clear about is that we cannot simply
generalise from what we know about the
treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder
to the facilitation of post-traumatic growth.
The facilitation of post-traumatic growth is
not easily amenable to the techniques of
cognitive behaviour therapy, or to treatment
approaches taken from a manual. Our view
at this stage is that we will begin to find
more client-centred, experiential, and
existential psychotherapies of value in the
facilitation of post-traumatic growth. 
An awareness of the potential for
positive change following trauma provides
a potentially rich seam for therapists to
consider in their work with traumatised
persons. We believe that post-traumatic
growth harnesses the core principles of
positive psychology, and that these
principles can be put to effective use in the
therapeutic service of trauma survivors.
 P. Alex Linley and Dr Stephen Joseph
are in the Department of Psychology at the
University of Warwick. E-mail:
P.A.Linley@warwick.ac.uk or
S.Joseph@warwick.ac.uk.
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JOSEPH argue that positive
psychology can even light the
darkness of trauma.
Trauma and
personal growth
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O F the numerous therapeuticapproaches available to thepractising psychologist, many
appear to be good candidates for ‘positive’
practice. But therapeutic approaches derived
from existential philosophy rarely figure
highly in this quest. This is hardly
surprising, given that existential
psychotherapy takes its roots from European
philosophers such as Kierkegaard and
Nietzsche, who derived profound insights
out of their personal confrontations with
misery, hardship and death. But the view 
we present here is that despite its morbid
reputation, a therapeutic approach derived
from an existential perspective can – and
should – be considered as an approach that
parallels many of the emphases of positive
psychology. 
Existentialism itself is notoriously
difficult to define (Warnock, 1970) and
even among practitioners of existential
psychotherapy there is a diversity of
opinion as to how (or even whether it is
possible) to outline the approach. Spinelli
(1997) offers a definition:
…existential-phenomenological theory
has always insisted upon viewing
human beings from a relational rather
than an isolated perspective… In a
therapeutic context, this stance
reconsiders the problems and dilemmas
that are presented in therapy as
dialogical statements that express
various anxieties and insecurities of
relational existence. (p.5)
As a consequence, the therapist–patient
relationship can be considered the principal
concern in the application of existential
thought to clinical practice (Spinelli, 1997;
Yalom, 1999). This is not in the positive-
empathic ethos of the person-centred
tradition, or in the transference/
countertransference mould of
psychoanalytically oriented approaches.
Rather, the existential approach aims to
clarify and elaborate the patient’s way 
of being-in-the-world, by using the
therapeutic context as a microcosmic
indication of the client’s relationship 
to the world (van Deurzen-Smith, 1988). 
This is what makes the existential
perspective a positive approach – it seeks
to examine and illuminate what is there,
rather than correct what is lacking.
Perhaps the most obvious way in which
the existential approach parallels positive
psychology is in its preoccupation with
what is presented by the client rather than
with global models of deficit and disorder.
Using the phenomenological method,
therapists attempt to ‘bracket’ (put to one
side) many of the assumptions and
reactions they have with regard to clients
(including the desire for therapeutic
progress) so as to better engage with a
client’s way of being. By stepping back
from their own prejudices and stereotypes,
existential therapists can identify clients’
possibilities as well as their limitations,
their strengths as well as their weaknesses
(van Deurzen-Smith, 1988), rather than
being attuned principally to the signs and
symptoms of psychological disorder. The
existentialists suggest that by identifying
the constellations of meaning by which we
relate to the world, we give ourselves the
opportunity of decision – to decide whether
to alter our way of being in the world. 
The existential dual concern with
possibility and limitation provides a
framework within which the practice of
positive psychology can recognise human
potential without succumbing to an
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ROGER BRETHERTON and
RODERICK ØRNER believe that 
a ‘positive’ psychotherapy needs to
recognise potential and limitations.
‘meaning can be found even
in the face of the
unchangeable givens of life,
such as pain, guilt and death’
Positive psychotherapy
in disguise
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unrealistic optimism. Optimism represents
the expectation of a favourable outcome.
Hope, being more flexible, recognises
situations where the possibility of a
favourable outcome may be blocked. Hope
is characterised by an openness to the
difficulty of the experience, yet maintains 
a flexibility of response to the challenges 
of life (Calhoun & Tedeschi, 1998). The
existential approach is therefore neither
pessimistic nor optimistic, but can be
profoundly hopeful – meaning can be
found even in the face of the unchangeable
givens of life, such as pain, guilt and death
(Frankl, 1969). By facing up to the
questions posed by suffering, existential
psychotherapy lends itself to the
understanding of people confronting the
extreme challenges of life, such as HIV
(Milton, 1997) or terminal cancer
(Jacobsen et al., 2000). 
Any perspective on life perpetuates 
a fantasy when it elevates the rich
possibilities of our existence without 
taking account of the limiting factors of the
human condition (e.g. death, loss, illness).
A truly positive psychology does not
deliver us from our troubles but speaks 
to us in them. We consider the existential
approach to be positive psychotherapy in
disguise, given its recognition of human
potential coupled with an awareness of 
the irreversible difficulties of the human
condition.
 Roger Bretherton and Roderick Ørner
are clinical psychologists with Lincolnshire
Healthcare NHS Trust. 
E-mail: rojbret@clinpsych.freeserve.co.uk.
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Some visions for the future of psychology are highly
optimistic, but a recent analysis suggests that work
psychology is entering a dark age. JONATHAN HILL.
Bleak future 
or new dawn?
AWIDELY-FRAMED – evenvisionary – perspective for ourdiscipline is promoted by
Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000)
through their emphasis on positive
psychology. Such sweeping and optimistic
horizons for the future seem primarily to
originate from leaders of psychology in the
United States. But what sense might work
psychologists elsewhere expect to make of
such ambitious projects? 
Much of work psychology has
emphasised performance deficits and work-
related stress, rather than ‘positive’
psychology. Employee weaknesses 
and limitations are diagnosed through
underperformance in development centre
exercises. The lower scores on 360-degree
(multi-rater) questionnaire ratings of co-
workers by co-workers are highlighted and
represented as developmental opportunities;
whereas development based on identified
strengths may be more productive.
Research on attracting staff to the
workplace has been neglected, while
definitions of competence and
incompetence are endlessly reworked.
Investigations of bullying benefit from
close attention, but little effort is applied 
to the study of very considerate colleagues
in their most considerate moments.
Sometimes the diagnostic torch is 
turned upon the internal fissures in the
subdiscipline of work psychology and the
fault lines picked out around the great
scientist/practitioner divide. Anderson et al.
(2001) have identified three bad kinds of
work psychology, and one good kind. Their
model is framed by the two dimensions of
relevance and rigour, and contains four
cells: popularist science, pedantic science,
puerile science, and pragmatic science.
Several pressures lead to an increase in the
volume of either pedantic or popularist
science by work psychologists, and to
diminishing opportunities for good
pragmatic science that yet manages to
combine relevance with rigour. The
solution Anderson et al. propose is for
work psychologists to develop key political
skills, including leadership, in order to
influence and attract the support of a wider
range of stakeholders with whom research
and consulting partnerships may be formed. 
Building a wider constituency, however,
may also require a quantum leap in the
ambitions of work psychologists. At present
their highest aspiration seems to be to
become useful problem solvers delivering
social maintenance (offering tactical repairs
to the selection process) rather than social
architecture (embracing organisational
design and strategic transformation).
Exceptions from near the popularist end of
the market, however, include the accounts of
talent (or high-performance) management by
Woodruffe (1999) and by Williams (2000).
Partly as a result of such work, talent
now features on the agenda of many key
decision makers in public and private sector
organisations. In a more measured way,
Warr (1999) has contributed to the
discovery of those factors at work and in
life that enhance affective well-being.
These include environmental factors such
as opportunity for skill use, interpersonal
contact, personal control, and social
approval. Graduate entrants to the
workforce, psychologists included, may
hope that such opportunities are within
reach. But a different twist to understanding
socialisation into the workplace has been
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provided by Arnold (1985). Arnold asked
graduates to describe in their own words
the surprises they experienced in handling
the transition from university to full-time
employment. The study of surprises in the
workplace, including pleasant ones, is
perhaps an antidote to pedantry. 
A further increase in research into the
work performance of humane leaders may
be one of the many consequences flowing
from the tragedy of September 11th. As
new models of leadership emerge from the
US, redesign work will be needed to
acknowledge a different expression of
leadership values in various countries. In
this respect, the significant reworking of
transformational leadership studies for UK
organisations by Alimo-Metcalfe and
Alban-Metcalfe (2001) illustrates the
advantages of positive creativity over
purely sceptical critique.
Towards an alternative agenda 
The faults and failings of humans at work
naturally secure the attention of work
psychologists. As long as costly errors of
judgement are made in the workplace, such
obligations will endure. But some work
psychologists may choose instead to focus
on talent, well-being and the visionary
leadership of organisations, in pursuit of an
alternative research agenda of equal merit
and perhaps greater pragmatic relevance in
the longer term.
 Dr Jonathan Hill is in the
Occupational Section, School of
Psychology at the University of Leicester.
E-mail: jrwh1@leicester.ac.uk.
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Positive
SO far the positive psychologymovement has concentratedprimarily on studying positive
experiences and positive characteristics in
individuals, and some features associated
with positive communities. Several other
levels of analysis, notably the group and
organisation, are worth attending to. 
Some of the characteristics that have
been attributed to positive groups include
the merits of recognising diversity (in
cognitive style, perspective, and ways of
working: Belbin, 1981), adopting a win-
win attitude to negotiation of all kinds and
the application of the principles underlying
conflict resolution where parties disagree. 
The traditional command-and-control
approach to managing organisations might
seem rather antithetical to psychological
well-being. Individuals lack control over
their working lives, a state associated with
higher stress and lower satisfaction levels.
However, studies of ‘flow’, the state of
mind characterised by a happy absorption
in challenging tasks, suggest that many
people report it at work at least as often as
in leisure. Delle Fave (2001) reports finding
flow experiences common in all the
occupational groups she has studied to date
(e.g. doctors, teachers) except office
workers, where such experiences are rare. 
It has been suggested that traditional
management practices effectively treat
workers like children who need to be told
what to do (e.g. Semler, 1997). Argyris
(1957) has long argued that organisations
encourage defensive behaviour and that 
a more participatory form of organisation,
where workers are given more control of
their working lives and the decisions that
affect them, would offer a more mature
form of organisation. 
In the last 20 years or so organisational
rhetoric would suggest we have made
considerable strides in this direction.
Increased competition has led to
downsized, leaner organisations with less
middle management and greater reliance on
Go with the flow – many workers find themselves happily absorbed in challenging tasks
teamwork. This, coupled with the
increasing pace of change requiring
prompter responses, encouraged
organisations to empower staff and push
responsibility down. The need for high-
wage economies to draw out the creativity
in all their staff to aid continuous
improvement has encouraged attempts to
develop more open work cultures. In
addition, organisational kitemarks like IIP
(Investors in People) now require attention
to individual development needs, and the
manager’s role has arguably become more
a matter of facilitation. The buzzwords of
the day are cooperation and partnership,
not command and control, and it is
commonplace for erstwhile competitors
like Ford and Fiat to work together to
develop new products. 
In short, many staff now seem to be
granted greater autonomy over when they
work and how they achieve their work
goals. Many academics, for example, now
primarily work at home (White, 2001).
Kanter (1997) and Handy (1995) argue that
it is now commitment to common values
that forms the glue that keeps the modern
organisation together. 
But at the same time increasing workloads
plus an increase in measurement of the
work being done has led to greater stress
for many workers. It appears to be largely
for this reason that job satisfaction measures
have tended recently to go down rather
than up (Taylor, 2002). Generally, more
open working practices may have a positive
outcome provided they are not associated
with an excessive increase in work pressure.
Certain companies have gone out of
their way to build more positive
organisations. One approach advocates 
a shift to a position where staff effectively
self-organise; for example, they set their
own hours, hire their own staff, buy their
own equipment, appraise bosses, have
control of their own expenses and, in 
some cases, their share of the profits. 
The majority of the people in organisations 
that have tried this, like Dutton and Semco,
report high levels of satisfaction. In such
organisations, people may work hard but
they have much more control over when
and how they work. 
However, an open-ended work climate
does not seem to suit all psychological
types. Organisations undertaking a culture-
change programme of this kind, in which
middle management typically lose some
authority, usually end up losing a
percentage of staff who cannot adapt to the
changed way of working. There is some
evidence that those with an adaptive style,
who favour working in more tried and
tested ways, prefer a more ordered work
environment than those with an innovator
style who, tolerating ambiguity better and
enjoying challenging the status quo, favour
a more open-ended work environment
(Ekvall, 1997). 
So far, self-organisation has been 
tried primarily in small and medium-sized
enterprises. The extent to which such
practices are applicable to larger
organisations is open to question. One can
also question whether the individualistic
and democratic values underlying many 
of these modern approaches to organisation
are applicable to more communal and
especially more hierarchical cultures
(Hofstede, 1984). 
At present the long-term relationship
between values, performance and work
satisfaction is not clear cut. Further
research into organisation practices that
lead to more positive experiences at work
is required, especially given that many of
us spend most of our working lives
working in organisations we judge as less
than ‘positive’.
 Jane Henry is at the Open University.
E-mail: j.a.henry@open.ac.uk.
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Organisational rhetoric may be set in a positive frame,
but why has satisfaction at work declined? JANE HENRY
investigates.
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‘The buzzwords of the day
are cooperation and
partnership, not command
and control’
IMAGINE you are a prime minister or a president. You want – if only becauseyou hope to be re-elected – to make
your citizens happy and to run your
country efficiently. You know that people
care about personal factors (like their
health, their income, and how well they get
on with their spouse). You have an intuitive
idea that they care also about external
factors (like the inflation rate, or how much
aircraft noise there is over their house). But
how do you work out the relative
importance of all these things? This is an
extraordinarily difficult and subtle question.
It requires us to weigh up different
influences on well-being, and put values 
on one thing compared with another. 
Economists like me have recently
developed a way to do just this. This new
method shows, among other things, that
‘external’ forces, like the inflation rate,
really matter a lot to our well-being. The
method is fairly statistical, so can look
daunting to non-mathematicians. But the
ideas are terribly simple. It just boils down
to averaging the answers that people give
in happiness surveys (of the sort discussed
in Diener et al., 1999, for instance). 
Say I am assessing, on a scale of 1 to
10, how happy I feel. Perhaps I give the
answer 7. Then, let us imagine, I get a pay
rise of £10,000, and in my next happiness
survey I give the answer 8. That gives the
statistical investigator a little bit of
information about me. Now imagine that
my marriage breaks up, and I am observed
to drop my happiness score to a 5. That is 
a little more information. Or consider what
happens if there is some external bad event,
like a sharp rise in inflation and that
worries me. Then, perhaps, I reduce 
my happiness score again a by a small
amount. 
All these movements in happiness
‘scores’ contain valuable information. One
individual alone does not provide much
that is useful, partly because he or she may
be going through lots of other events in
life, or simply changing mood, in ways 
the investigator cannot easily observe.
However, if we average across individuals
who experience the same life event, it is
possible to learn a great deal about the
forces that bear on human happiness.
Oswald (1997) gives some more detail. 
First, to set the scene, say we start with
the background to modern research on
subjective well-being. In the last few years,
economists have developed a way to
measure, and to put a financial value upon,
the happiness induced by different kinds of
personal or ‘internal’ influences and life
events. They record the mental well-being
levels of people in large samples at
different points in time. Economists (and
other investigators) go on to study the
incomes of, and events that occurred to,
the individuals, and then use statistical
methods (regression equations) to work out
the implied consequences upon well-being
of different occurrences in life. Clark and
Oswald (in press) is an example. This
method is now also starting to be used to
study how ‘external’ factors – inflation,
the generosity of unemployment benefits,
noise, or even outside social factors like the
quality of democracy as in Frey and Stutzer
(2000, 2001) – affect people’s well-being. 
Intuitively, what this method does is to
start by facing up to the obvious fact that
many things shape human happiness.
Relationships matter, health matters,
money matters. Within a statistical
equation, these and other factors can 
be allowed for at the same time. Their
respective weights in well-being can then
be calculated. This can be generalised. In
particular, it is possible to allow for
external forces on human well-being. The
environment, broadly interpreted, affects
people’s happiness, and we can allow for 
it statistically. 
How does all this work? Consider 
a person who experiences good and bad
events. Imagine that the person enjoys
money. In principle, then, it is possible to
calculate how much extra income would
have to be given to the person to
compensate exactly (neither too much nor
too little) for any bad occurrence in life.
This is done by seeing how much higher 
on a happiness score sheet a person marks
when he or she gets more cash. That
amount of cash can be thought of as a
measure of the unpleasantness of the event.
Equivalently, good events – falling in love
and getting married, say – can be studied.
Then, to work out how valuable in a deep
happiness sense such an event is to 
a person, we determine statistically how
much money would have to be taken out 
of a person’s salary cheque to result in the
same happiness level as before the good
event. People are not asked to put a price
on the event themselves: it is assessed by
comparing the change in numerical scores
on happiness surveys.
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How much do external
factors affect well-being?
ANDREW J. OSWALD describes how he has been using
‘happiness economics’ to decide.
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Imagine, perhaps, that an individual
changes from employment to
unemployment. It is known that this is 
a bad life event. The compensating
differential (in the jargon) for this transition
would be the amount of extra money, or
increment to income, which would be
required exactly to compensate the worker
for being unemployed, i.e. to keep the
worker at the same level of subjective well-
being. Because of the large psychic costs
of job loss, recent estimates put the
resulting happiness loss at almost £100,000
a year. In other words, it is far more than
the sheer loss of a pay packet. Similarly,
the loss of happiness caused by marriage
breakup is estimated at £60,000.
This general technique has been used
by economists to calculate all sorts of
things – for instance the happiness loss
from being black rather than white in the
United States of America and the value of 
a lasting marriage (Blanchflower &
Oswald, in press), and the valuation of
aircraft noise around Schiphol airport 
(van Praag & Baarsma, 2000). As with
most regression analyses, the underlying
assumption here is that a linear equation is
a useful approximation to reality.
External economic factors have only
recently been studied. Di Tella et al.
(2001), for example, take data from 12
countries on hundreds of thousands of
randomly sampled Europeans. They
measure their subjective life satisfaction 
on a four-point scale. They show that,
statistically, these life satisfaction reports
depend on the person’s age, gender,
income, education, and other personal
factors. Then they control for all those
things – they hold them constant in 
a statistical sense. 
The authors go on to look at the
remaining correlations in life satisfaction
with four outside variables: inflation,
unemployment, gross domestic product (in
other words how rich the country is) and
the generosity of unemployment benefits.
Using this method they find, consistent
with common sense, that when the inflation
rates goes up, people in a country en masse
mark lower on their well-being score
sheets. Of course, those people are not
aware they are doing so as a group; each
person thinks only of their own life when
they fill up the happiness survey sheets, but
they do exhibit a group pattern. Similarly,
when unemployment rises, people mark
lower on life-satisfaction score sheets.
Rises in GDP and the generosity of
unemployment benefits, however, do the
opposite, sensibly enough. Individuals in
the countries then mark higher on their life-
satisfaction survey forms.
Di Tella et al. (2001) also show that
pure ‘fear’ of unemployment creates large
losses. When joblessness goes up in a
country, happiness levels decline even
among those who themselves neither 
lose their job nor take a pay reduction.
Unsurprisingly, standards of comparison
matter. People look over their shoulders.
For example, Clark (in press) has the
intriguing finding that in places with more
unemployment, it is psychologically easier
to be unemployed oneself. The
unhappiness from individual joblessness is
easier to bear if you are surrounded in your
area by jobless people. In principle, exactly
the same techniques can be applied to data
on job satisfaction. The kinds of best-fitting
statistical equations in, for example, Clark
et al. (1996) could be generalised to
include external influences as well as
personal ‘internal’ ones.
Although hardly anyone has yet got to
the study of social factors on happiness, it
is bound to be a growth area over the
decade. Frey and Stutzer (2000, 2001) have
recently looked at the effects of democracy
upon personal happiness. They showed that
in Switzerland there is a greater degree of
happiness in those cantons whose
democracies work more efficiently, after 
all other influences had been factored out. 
To sum up, economists are studying
happiness. They have a lot to learn about
the use of subjective well-being data, but
their way of doing things, using regression
equations, has some advantages. In
particular, we are developing ways to 
work out how much human happiness is
influenced by external factors.
 Andrew J. Oswald is a professor of
economics at the University of Warwick. 
E-mail: Andrew.Oswald@warwick.ac.uk.
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ACCORDING to Pettigrew (1998),‘the public policy arena is scaldinghot and controversial’ (p.663).
Perhaps such heat in the social policy
kitchen is why psychologists have been
avoiding the challenge of applying
psychology in a way that makes it relevant
to policymakers concerned with issues such
as ethnic conflict. This is despite the fact
that such conflicts clearly entail
psychological issues, such as security, fear,
destructive ideologies, enemy images, and 
a host of other concerns that bear on human
well-being and survival (Anderson &
Christie, 2001). 
Despite this it is clear that psychology 
is now in a position to make a unique
contribution in this multidisciplinary area
(Cairns, 2001). This is being done through
the application of research that has explored
the dynamics underlying ethnic conflict
(demonstrating that it is not a
psychopathological phenomenon) and by
contributing to the ‘invention’ of peace.
Many examples of psychology’s role in 
this area are beginning to accumulate. 
Close to home, for example,
psychologists in Northern Ireland have
played, and are playing, a modest role in
the peace process (Cairns & Darby, 1998).
They have been involved in testing and
refining ‘the contact hypothesis’ (Allport,
1954; Amir, 1969), which argues that
contact between people will ultimately lead
to reduced conflict. The contact hypothesis
has formed an important part of the strategy
adopted by policy makers in Northern
Ireland in their attempts to improve
community relations.
Here we will confine ourselves to
describing the work of three exemplars
whose endeavours illustrate the contribution
that psychology can make to three areas
that are key to the challenge of ending war
and promoting peace – conflict resolution,
ending cycles of revenge post-conflict, and
promoting world peace.
Conflict resolution An example 
of more direct involvement in conflict
resolution is the work of Herbert Kelman.
Kelman is a social and political
psychologist who works on international
conflict and conflict resolution. For many
years, he has focused on the Arab-Israeli
conflict (see e.g. Kelman, 1997). Through 
a series of interactive problem-solving
conflict resolution workshops he is credited
with developing a cadre of Israelis and
Palestinians many of whom were involved
in the negations leading to the Oslo Peace
Accord in 1993 (Pettigrew, 1998).
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People ‘invented’ war. Now ED
CAIRNS and CHRISTOPHER ALAN
LEWIS describe pioneering work
under way to ‘invent’ peace.
WEBLINKS
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‘Peace psychology and
positive psychology together
represent a powerful force
for building better societies’
Empowering peace
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Ending cycles of revenge South
African psychologists have a long history
of attempting to apply psychological
knowledge to the problems facing their
society (Foster & Louw-Potgeiter, 1991).
Following the ending of apartheid,
psychologists are now engaged in various
attempts to heal the wounds inflicted by
years of conflict. One notable application
of psychology to social policy in South
Africa is the contribution by Foster to the
Final Report of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (1998).
Volume 5, chapter 7 of the report patently
uses social identity theory to explain that
during the conflict in South Africa people
acted as they did because they were acting
in terms of their social identities and in an
intergroup, rather than an interpersonal,
context. They did not act in this way
because they were inherently evil or
clinically disturbed. 
Promoting world peace The Seville
Statement on Violence (Adams, 1991)
asserts that it is scientifically incorrect to
say that human beings have an inherited
tendency to make war or to behave
violently. Fired by an interest in such
things, Adams (originally specialising in
brain mechanism of aggressive behaviour)
joined UNESCO and became a prime
mover in the establishment of UNESCO’s
Cultures of Peace movement. This
ambitious project aims to promote
tolerance and to build ‘seeing peace’,
seen not simply as an abstract concept 
(the absence of war) but as an active state
that the United Nations should use it best
efforts to promote. 
Linking the aim of the UN – to build
‘peace in the minds of men’ – with the
aims of positive psychology could prove 
to be a formidable combination. As 
the positive psychology movement has 
pointed out, for too long psychologists
have concentrated on cataloguing and
repairing the negative aspects of human
experience. The Cultures of Peace
movement has similarly recognised that 
too much emphasis has been placed on
ending war and not enough on learning
about and promoting peace. Peace
psychology and positive psychology
together represent a powerful force for
building better societies.
 Professor Ed Cairns and Dr
Christopher Alan Lewis are in the School
of Psychology, University of Ulster at
Coleraine, Northern Ireland. E-mail:
E.Cairns@ulster.ac.uk.
P.ALEX LINLEY and STEPHEN JOSEPH offer a way forward.
Putting it into practice
Positive psychology is simply psychology.
(Sheldon & King, 2001, p.216)
W E do not see positivepsychology as a ‘new’undertaking. Its early roots lie
in the philosophy of Aristotle (e.g. Kekes,
1995), and more recently in humanistic
psychology (e.g. Taylor, 2001). But as this
collection of articles has shown, it can
serve as a collective identity for disparate
efforts within psychology and the broader
social sciences. 
Positive psychology should be
recognised as being explicitly integrative,
focusing on both the successes and the
breakdowns of human functioning. It does
not deny the advances psychology has
made through its study of human
pathology. Rather, it seeks to redress the
balance, to ensure that health and fulfilment
are not neglected. An exclusive dominance
of the positive within psychology would be
just as limiting as a purely negative focus
(cf. Held, 2002).
We are encouraged that this collective
identity has brought together psychologists
and others from domains spanning both
applied (clinical, educational, forensic,
health, occupational) and academic
psychology (e.g. biological, cognitive,
developmental, social). We hope that this
breadth of interest will infuse new energy
into our discipline. In drawing this special
issue to a close, we hope to offer some
points of guidance as we seek to apply
positive psychology in our work as
psychologist-practitioners. 
Signposts
First, we must stop to consider ‘What is 
a good life?’ Relatedly, what might
psychologist-practitioners aspire to achieve
in facilitating their clients’ pursuit of this
good life? We must be ever mindful that 
a ‘one size fits all’ approach is insufficient:
there are many potential pathways. We
must also recognise that these questions
may not be reducible to scientific building
blocks, but are instead philosophical issues
of value and morality (see Kekes, 1995).
Second, we should consider how 
a psychology may fit within our existing
models of practice when it is focused on
human strength and virtue rather than
deficit and disorder, on prevention and
facilitation rather than treatment and
intervention. For some, positive psychology
may simply be a fashionable name for what
they have always believed and practised.
For others, adopting a positive
psychological way of working may be
more revolutionary than evolutionary. We
can draw comfort from a recent volume,
How Therapists Change (Goldfried, 2001);
no single psychological approach has all of
the answers, all of the time. We do not
expect positive psychology to be any
different. But we do hope that it encourages
psychologist-practitioners to consider how
their clients may wish to live in ways that
fulfill their abilities and potential.
Third, positive psychology should not
become sidelined as a subdiscipline for an
interested few. It should be the vanguard of
a new, integrative psychology (cf. Sternberg
& Grigorenko, 2001) that seeks to consider
human functioning across the range from
disorder to fulfilment. By studying the full
picture of what it means to be human, we
will achieve new understandings of human
nature that would be invisible when viewed
from a focus that was exclusively negative
– or positive.
As positive psychology advances, we
expect to be able to delineate improvements
in psychotherapy, in health care, in
education, in the rehabilitation of offenders,
in working practices, and in social policy,
to name a few. There is much work already
being conducted in all of these areas (see
this issue, and Snyder & Lopez, 2002).
Positive psychology serves as a beacon
under which people working to assist others
in their pursuit of a good life may gather. 
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